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Introduction
Why are we connecting the ancient myth of Prometheus with our contemporary 
challenges in reprogenetics? More generally, what is the power that narrative histories 
have to explain the complexity of the ever-changing reality? We could begin answering 
these questions by pointing out that narratives have always been a source of reflection 
about the deepest human concerns. In the period of Classical Antiquity, for example, 
we encounter the Homeric epics with a narrative-explicative system different than the 
one we find in the argumentative-explicative systems of ethicists and scientists. Myths, 
legends, and fables have an intrinsic explanatory power to capture a kind and level of 
complexity that is impossible to depict in “solid” argumentative systems that ethicists 
and scientists usually use to address the bioethical dilemmas.
The contemporary techno-scientific breakthroughs transform the world as we knew 
it, and this transformation alters the ways we relate to each other, and to the world 
as a whole. For better or for worse, science has emerged as a (alleged) master of 
existence. When humanity has reached the possibility of mass destruction, the 
world has become an uninviting place to live in; this power of science has managed 
to unsettle the standing order of reality by turning it into something fragile and 
perhaps even illusory. The ghost of the atom – of the nuclear fission and its ensuing 
nuclear mushroom – seems to follow a strange trajectory by expending itself to the 
power of the genes – with molecular biotechnology and genetics setting the current 
cutting edge of the scientific progress. This transformation affects our relationship 
with others and with ourselves, to the extent of silencing the ethical objections that 
often remain in the shadow of mercantilism. And that is why this transformation is 
not innocuous for the symbolic maintenance and further development of the 
human condition. The demiurgical character of modern science, its transforming 
power over human nature (and nature in general), seems to be provoking unsettling 
uncertainties and enormous challenges for the proper understanding of the 
evolving ethical controversies. The most important of them can be formulated in 
the most general terms as follows: Is that which is scientifically possible also 
morally desirable? 
In this essay we will address the intersection between bioethics and biopolitics by 
following the path of the controversies that arise in the fields of assisted reproductive 
technologies (ARTs), for this “privilege scenario” appears to undermine the very 
foundation of how we understand our own individuality and subjectivity. But before 
we address this issue, we need to clarify the Promethean challenge of modern science 
in general.
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“The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters”
This is the suggestive title of the etching produced by the Spanish painter Francisco 
Goya (1799). What does it add to our reflection? Before we answer this question, we 
would first like to touch on the ancient myth of Prometheus, and some of its 
numerous variations throughout the history of Western civilization. 
According to the ancient Greek mythology, Prometheus was the cleverest of Titans. 
His name means “the forward thinker,” the one with a capacity of forethought and 
prevision. (His brother and counterpart, Epimetheus, is the “backward-looking 
thinker.”) Although best known for his fire-theft, there is actually something subtler 
about Prometheus, which is why this figure continues to fascinate every new epoch of 
humanity. Namely, Prometheus learned all the arts and crafts from the goddess Athena 
and passed them on men. So, not just the possession of fire, ambiguous and double-
edged that it has always been, but the very becoming of man is theft from divinity: 
since providence is the attribute of godhead, not just fire but something else is stolen 
from gods, and that is divine provision (pre-vision; pronoia). As Nicolai Hartmann 
clarifies (Hartmann 1931, vol. 2, 148), “Foresight is the intuitive vision in man; in its 
highest power, it is prophecy. Prevision makes him move forward, conscious of his 
goal. Man does not live in the present alone. He belongs to the future. And the future 
belongs to him – within the limit of his prevision. Indeed, to speak exactly, the future 
is the only thing that practically does belong to him. The past stands eternally still and 
is not to be changed. Nor is the present to be changed any more than the past, it 
already has its irrevocable determination in itself.”
Zeus replied to the theft of fire by famously chaining Prometheus to a mountain, but 
he also took his revenge on humanity. According to Hesiod, Zeus sent Pandora, the 
first woman, to Prometheus’ brother, Epimetheus, who quickly fell victim to her 
charms. Pandora got a “gift” of a box (or jar) from Zeus, which she could not resist to 
open. By removing the lid, Pandora delivered to man the gift of grief, cares, and all 
evil, which cancel out the benefits bestowed by Prometheus’ theft of fire. As Roger 
Shattuck rightly pointed out (Shattuck 1996, 15), “Now, later versions of the 
Prometheus story that have come down to us usually make no mention of the closely 
linked figure of Pandora. Prometheus’s daring raid on Olympus produces a liberating 
fire for our ancestors, and the further consequences of that raid are forgotten. The 
most famous literary treatment of the Prometheus myth – a page in Plato’s Protagoras, 
Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, [Percy B.] Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound – leave out 
Pandora as an awkward appendage or complication. Thus they avoid dealing with the 
full consequences to humankind of the knowledge Prometheus brings as narrated in 
Hesiod’s earliest versions. Here is another instance of truth, Prometheus’ fire, being 
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separated from its consequences, Pandora’s disruptive presence among men. We may 
not like the full myth, but we are distorting it by cutting it in two. In classical Western 
painting, Pandora went on to become an allegorical figure for ‘beautiful evil’.”
Let us also mention here one more important development with regard to the 
Prometheus myth, which occurred in the aftermath of Kant’s philosophy. Although 
Nietzsche is acclaimed for pronouncing that “God is dead,” many historians of 
philosophy and culture in general recognize that Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
prepared the ground for this radical redirection of Western civilization. In the words 
of Kant’s contemporary, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Kant’s philosophy brings us to 
the crossroads at which we must make the most consequential choice: “Nothingness 
or a God.” 
While Kant himself was reluctant to make this choice – in his writings we can find 
evidence of him exploring, and even endorsing, each of the paths – his later 
contemporary, Goethe, seems to have taken a decisive turn against God’s dominance 
over our lives. Goethe’s famous poem, “Prometheus” (1772), is a rebellious denial of 
the divine Providence. The fundamental message of the poem seems to be that, if God 
had been concerned about man, He would have had to arrange the world differently. 
According to Goethe’s poem,
“I should honor you? For what? 
Have you softened the sufferings, 
Ever, of the burdened? 
Have you stilled the tears, 
Ever, of the anguished? 
Was I not forged as a Man 
By almighty Time 
And the eternal Fate, 
My masters and yours?
Do you somehow imagine 
I should hate life, 
Flee to the desert, 
Because not every 
Flowering dream may bloom?
Here I sit, forming people 
In my image; 
A race, to be like me, 
To suffer, to weep, 
To enjoy and delight themselves, 
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And to mock you – 
As I do!”
Jacobi was afraid that Goethe thought neither sufficiently nor deeply enough about 
the implications of this defiance of divinity. Jacobi was convinced that Goethe’s 
choice leads not only toward dangerous hubris, but eventually toward nihilism as 
well. According to Jacobi (Critchley 2001, 27), “Choosing Nothingness, [man] 
makes himself into a God; that is, he makes an apparition into God because if there 
is no God, it is impossible that man and everything which surrounds him is not 
merely an apparition. I repeat: God is, and is outside me, a living being, existing in 
itself, or I am God. There is no third.” 
It is hardly a matter of dispute that modern Western civilization has for the most 
part followed Goethe, turned away from faith, and attempted to test the creative 
power of humanity. Simon Critchley rightly warns that the results have become 
alarming (Critchley 2001, 27): “In denying God we risk turning the human being 
into God. That is, there is a Promethean temptation in Kantian and Fichtean 
idealism, where the human being turns into some replica of God, creating from 
nothing (it is worth recalling that Mary Shelley’s novel, Frankenstein [1818], was 
subtitled The Modern Prometheus, where something monstrous stalks the scientific 
rationalism of the Enlightenment).”
Shelley’s Frankenstein; Or, The Modern Prometheus, could be considered as one the 
first “science fiction” novels. There are different issues to reflect on with regard to 
this novel, but the one we are going to consider in detail involves the responsibility 
of a creator for his or her creation, together with the risks and consequences that 
accompany the growth of scientific knowledge. This topic is at the heart of our 
contemporary bioethical dilemmas, especially when we concentrate on the 
challenges posed by reprogenetics. 
To deal with such an enormously important matter, we will briefly refer to another 
myth, a legend that offers one of the fundamental insights of the Jewish tradition: 
the legend of the Golem (a “golem” is an animated anthropomorphic being, 
mysteriously created from inorganic matter, usually stone and clay). Already in this 
ancient legend there is a clear warning attached to the creative power. It is expressed 
through the rebellion of the creature against its creator, together with a threat of 
punishment that follows the irresponsible use of science and technology (in the 
form of evil, resulting from the unintended consequences of its careless use).
Why should we expect that this legend and Shelley’s novel are of relevance for the 
contemporary scenario of the assisted human reproduction? What analogies can be 
found between such mythical stories and fictive narratives on the one hand, and the 
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current concerns issuing from the super-modern technological scientific 
developments on the other?
These are some of the questions we are going to reflect on in this essay, while bearing 
in mind that analyzing the fictional references will complement our understanding 
of dilemmatic situations arising in bioethics. In the case of Shelley’s Frankenstein; 
Or, The Modern Prometheus, we could begin by saying that the story explores the 
topics such as scientific morality, the creation and destruction of life, and, no less 
importantly, the ambition of humanity to assume the role of God. Victor 
Frankenstein, who tries to compete in power with God, is a modern Prometheus 
who steals the sacred fire of life from gods and places it in front of the puzzled (and 
disoriented) mankind.
In the ancient Greek myth, Prometheus is originally understood as the “sculptor” of 
humanity, a Titan who created man from clay. It is interesting that this is the same 
creative activity that informs the myth of Golem, and it is also the spirit of Shelley’s 
Frankenstein. 
This novel, conceived in the early stages of the industrial revolution, actually looks 
beyond the historical period in which it was created. It is thus interesting to analyze 
some epochal references that frame its story. Due to the sudden eruption of the 
Tambora volcano and the unanticipated climatic changes that accompany the 
eruption, the northern hemisphere endures a long and cold “volcanic winter.” This 
particular climatic situation forces many people to remain sheltered from the 
inclement weather for long periods of time. In this point, Mary Shelley produces an 
eerie anticipation of our ensuing environmental meltdown.
It is also important to notice that the story of Frankenstein was influenced by the 
new research of Luigi Galvani and Erasmus Darwin that dealt with the power of 
electricity to revive dead bodies. Physiologist Luigi Galvani called this way of 
producing energy “bio-electro-genesis.” Through numerous spectacular experiments, 
he came to the conclusion that the electricity needed for the revival of dead bodies 
need not come from the outside, because it is already generated within the living 
organism itself, which, although dead, still retains the ability to drive the 
momentum and react to it accordingly. He argued that these experiments were the 
basis upon which science could consider the true nature of the nervous system as an 
electrical device. The studies by Galvani inaugurated a whole new scientific 
discipline that did not exist until then: “neurophysiology,” or studying the 
functioning of the nervous system based on neurology. The study of “galvanism” 
suddenly flooded the European universities during the late eighteenth century and 
the early nineteenth century. Experiments with animals, and even human corpses, 
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encouraged the hope that by means of electricity medical doctors could heal diseases 
caused by paralysis and even revive dead bodies.
We are dealing here, however, not with death and bringing back to life dead bodies 
but with new life and its creation. We recognize that it is very challenging for our 
present referential frameworks to address adequately the field of assisted reproductive 
technologies. One of the key questions – as difficult as it is important – concerns, 
generally speaking, the origin of life. The scientific breakthrough has produced a 
different understanding of how we conceptualize our human experience in the 
world. As Jacobi forewarned, when “Science” tries to stand in the place of Creator, 
truths and certainties get mixed. Science has not (yet) found a satisfactory answer to 
the question of the origin of life (and may probably never find it in the way in 
which the contemporary science is approaching this question). But what origin are 
we asking about? The origin that determines our human condition, the one that 
extracts us from the field of animality to became – via the use of language – the 
human creatures. As Dudley Young points out (Young 1992, 6), “Science, to put it 
bluntly, is uneasy with beginnings. Mythology, on the contrary, is concerned above 
all with what happened ‘in the beginning’… Its signature is ‘Once upon a time’, 
and its characteristic way of bridging a gap between nonbeing and being is to 
imagine gods and goddesses to step over it.”
Not surprisingly, then, Young maintains that the origin of humanity is best dealt 
with though a fictional narration which recounts what no scientific explanation can 
satisfactorily do. The origin is something that we were told about – for example, 
when little children ask those seemingly innocent yet annoying questions about the 
beginning and origin of everything (including who created God). Regardless of how 
patient and satisfactory our “answers” may be, it is important to recognize that they 
provide a narrative scheme that builds our “family romance” from the beginning of 
our human existence. Young insists that the possibility of telling a story of our 
experience is what characterizes our human disposition in this world. We will 
address later the importance of building some sort of narrative about the origin 
when children are conceived though ARTs.
Since Science seems to challenge our subjectivity in almost all spheres of our 
experience, it should come as no surprise that the appeal to ethics has become so 
urgent. When we say “Science,” we refer to the paradigm of the techno-scientific 
rationality, that is, the very heart of modern science. The ideal of modern science, as 
defined by Bacon and Descartes, was to succeed in imposing man as the lord and 
master of nature. It is an ideal of domination, appropriation, and exploitation that 
subjects nature to man. Modern reason was conceived in both the theoretical and 
practical planes. Being rational has become synonymous with analyzing, organizing, 
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manipulating, controlling, and determining the efficient and safe means, the most 
economical and productive means. In order to do this, it is necessary to organize the 
division of human labor in the most effective way. Instrumental reason defines the 
means to achieve a given end or goal. It is exclusively interested in instruments or 
tools and it calculates the most machine-like way to obtain our preselected goals. 
We are so engrossed in our instrumental reasoning that we have become negligent 
of asking fundamental questions and looking beyond our immediate practical 
interest. We are so disinterested in “forward thinking” that the myth of Prometheus 
has lost its appeal to us – to our own peril. This sentiment is brilliantly captured in 
Franz Kafka’s concise rendering of the myth. According to Kafka’s “Prometheus,” 
there are four versions of the myth:
“According to the first, he was clamped to a rock in the Caucasus for betraying the 
secrets of the gods to men, and the gods sent eagles to feed on his liver, which was 
perpetually renewed.
According to the second, Prometheus, goaded by the pain of the tearing beaks, 
pressed himself deeper and deeper into the rock until he became one with it.
According to the third, his treachery was forgotten in the course of thousands of 
years, forgotten by the gods, the eagles, forgotten by himself. 
According to the fourth, everyone grew weary of the meaningless affair. The gods 
grew weary, the eagles grew weary, the wound closed wearily.
There remained the inexplicable mass of rock. The legend tried to explain the 
inexplicable. As it came out of a substratum of truth it had in turn to end in the 
inexplicable.”1 
If we take this Kafkian stand toward the myth of Prometheus, if everything becomes 
“the inexplicable mass of rock,” it includes not only the Promethean foresight but 
also the abandonment of an ethical stance and, ultimately, the death of humanity. 
Goya’s warnings rings true: the sleep of reason produces monsters!
ARTs: Bioethics and its Promethean Challenge
We will now address a specific scenario that is nowadays in the eye of the storm for 
several reasons. This scenario could be defined as an emerging focal point for 
contemporary bioethics (Lima & Cicovacki, 2014). We would like to call it 
1 Quoted from Franz Kafka, The Complete Stories, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir (New York: Schocken Books, 
1971), 432. 
Natacha Salomé Lima, Predrag Cicovacki: Contemporary Bioethics: The Promethean Challenges...  str. 29 – 44
37
“reprogenetics.” The term was coined by Lee M. Silver, professor of molecular 
biology at Princeton University, who in 1997 published his book: Remaking Eden: 
Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World. Briefly, reprogenetics is a term that refers 
to the connection of the assisted reproductive technologies with the genetic 
engineering. Symbolically speaking, we can say that reprogenetics is the name that 
condenses multiple perspectives and problems occurring in the present-day 
bioethics.
Before beginning with our consideration of what those perspectives and problems 
are, we would like to establish a terminological and conceptual distinction between 
eugenics (=selective breading as a way of human improvement) and reprogenetics. 
Could it be argued that there is a connection between these two notions? If so, what 
has been the passage from the ideas contained in the modern term “eugenics” to the 
post-modern notion of “reprogenetics”? 
We can remark that at the beginning of its use, the term eugenics was intimately 
related to a dark tradition which started with the atrocities perpetrated by Nazi 
doctors during the Second World War. The term eugenics has since then been 
associated with the Aryan ideal aiming at an “improvement of the race” via genetic 
manipulation, among other aberrations committed in pursuit of this irrational ideal. 
Nowadays, however, the reproductive techniques are also capable of creating those 
fundamental genetic modifications, but the ideal has changed. If a genetic 
manipulation is used at all, the ideal is to try preventing – if possible – the 
transmission of future diseases and thus serving the best interest of the newborns. 
The use of this new word reprogenetics – which may also include gene manipulations 
– could be suitable in an attempt to erase the negative association and the 
implications of the abuse of science contained in the word eugenics. 
We consider this specific field of reprogenetics within applied ethics as a privileged 
scenario because it establishes a dialogue between (i) the recent scientific 
developments, (ii) the regulatory domain (or legal discourse), and (iii) the subjective 
(individual, personal) dimension. The field of reprogenetics launches us into a world 
of uncertainties through its mixture of different discourses, the power struggles, the 
super-sophisticated technical practices, and vastly diversified worldviews. It 
abolishes the conventional models of thought and behavior in some cases, and 
deeply modifies them in others, by promoting radical changes in the traditional 
forms of family planning and family structures. 
We could begin by placing the developments in reprogenetics between the spheres 
of the technological possibilities and the concerns of individuals. Our main purpose 
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is to outline a few conflicting issues of the daily practice in order to clarify some 
central topics and offer our reflections with regard to them. 
• How can the development of assisted reproductive technologies affect the 
demographic transitions? Sex selection techniques are available and in certain 
countries male offspring are desired in order to provide support to families. 
What would happen, then, if this kind of preference affects the natural sex 
distribution? 
• Another issue to address is the impact of these technologies on the female 
body, for example in cases of surrogated motherhood, and also in cases of in-
vitro fertilization (IVF). In the case of surrogate motherhood, which is 
nowadays usually not regulated, Croatia proposed a novel legislative solution 
which would under certain conditions allow: 1) the surrogate mother not 
obtaining a commercial or material benefit from the operation; and 2) the 
surrogate mother would have the choice of keeping the child at birth (Vidlička, 
Hrstić, Kirin, 2012).
• The post-mortem sperm retrieval is yet another controversial issue: What 
happens in cases of patients suffering brain death or those in the persistent 
vegetative state? Are there ethical reasons that support this practice when there 
is a valid prior consent? Are we considering the fundamental interests of a 
child? 
• Ethical concerns in the pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. This scenario leads 
not only to the questions regarding embryo selection, but it also questions the 
validity of the human desire when the baby is made – or “manufactured” – 
with certain objectives. 
• The last scenario we will address is the Intra-Cytoplasmic Sperm Injection 
(ICSI). This procedure enables that a single sperm be injected directly into an 
egg, in a medically controlled clinical environment, outside the uterus of the 
female. This medical fact can have major consequences on our reproductive 
techniques, for it produces extra-corporeal embryos. In the past it was 
impossible to conceive a baby without (outside) the female body. Today we 
still need a woman’s body to carry the pregnancy, but the embryo is produced 
outside the body. When this happens, the embryo becomes equidistant to men 
and woman and it could become an object of quarrel if the couple separates, 
or if one of them dies. This technique also leads to the questions regarding the 
scope of sperm donation, the use of this treatment not only for dealing with 
infertility problems, but also for dealing with women and men who are single, 
or some homo-sexual couples which want to establish a family and have their 
own child. 
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Each of these points, which has been briefly outlined, will need to be discussed in 
detail in the future. Our intention here is to establish a pattern of relations between 
these scenarios, which include the public and the private spheres in need of state 
regulations. Just by having a look to this introductory scheme we could observe that 
the field of ARTs presents enormous controversies in the field of science, medicine, 
technology, ethics, and religion. Perhaps even more urgently, it raises the especially 
troubling concerns in the field of subjective choices and decisions. 
Right to Identity and Legal Controversies in ARTs:  
The Case of the New Argentinean Civil Code
Argentina is in process of establishing a new Civil Code, which will come into force 
in January 2016. Some of the articles the new code includes present a revision of the 
old codes and practices – especially the ones related to the Family Law. Generally 
speaking, the changed code aims toward assigning more power and autonomy to an 
individual moral agent. In the last decade Argentina has developed a significant 
number of legislations aiming at expanding the area of human rights. To mention 
two examples, we can quote Law No. 26.862, dealing with the “comprehensive 
access to health care procedures and assisted reproductive technologies” (2013), Law 
No. 26.618, concerning “equal marriages” (2010), and Law No. 26.743 (2012), 
dealing with gender identity. These laws represent a significant step forward in 
liberating our attitudes toward sexual identity and the scope of family models. 
Another important step forward consists in a clear legal differentiation – for the 
cases of ARTs – between the two stages of the process: conception and implantation. 
Although the status of embryos has not yet been regulated, Argentina is in the 
processes of drafting a special legislation concerning embryos, which will help to 
clarify their status, at least in the legal sphere. Lawyers specializing in family 
legislation recommended that we should understand these modifications of the legal 
discourse as a whole (the specific legislation of ARTs and the new outlines of the 
Civil Code 2016) in accordance with the recent international regulations, for 
example the Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Humans Rights (UNESCO, 
2005).2 These new legislations would enable people to establish a family in (so to 
say) their own terms. In the future, every society will have to discuss the subjective 
and social implications of these procedures. 
2 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, UNESCO, 2005, Article 16, Protecting Future Gener-
ations: The impact of life sciences on future generations, including their genetic constitution, should be given due regard.” 
Despite its brevity, this legal proposition presents the heart of the problem, dealing with how genetic manipulation 
could affect the symbolic development of the human species if the ethical concerns are not taken into account.
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There are still many concerns about the outcomes of the new technological 
developments that need to be regulated and the new practices that are only available 
because of those technological and scientific developments, but are still regarded as 
controversial in our societies. For example, after a cycle of an in-vitro fertilization, 
there are leftover embryos. The process of the embryo cryopreservation is useful for 
the embryo donation to another person. Vitrification  is a very promising 
cryopreservation method. These new technical possibilities, such as vitrification, 
enable the conservation of embryos for an almost indefinite period of time, and that 
is why their preservation has to be legally regulated.  What is going to be the 
destination of the leftover embryos and for how long should they be conserved? The 
problem that arises in this particular scenario is that as these techniques are relatively 
new and still experimental, we still do not have many adults born through vitrified 
embryos to prove the reliability of this method. 
All of this suggests that we will have to deal with complex debates in the near future. 
One of the issues that interest us now is how to consider the dynamic relation 
between the parenthood and the procreational will. How should we understand the 
relation of filiation in cases of the assisted reproductive technologies? First, we 
would like to explore the dialectical tension between the Right to Identity and the 
Right to Privacy (or confidentiality of the donor in cases of heterologous 
fertilization). There are several topics to address. One is that the cases of sperm or 
egg donation involve a “third party reproduction”; and while some countries sustain 
the anonymity of the donor, in others the law requires their non-anonymity. There 
is also a possibility of what can be called a “semi-anonymity,” in which the donor 
may provide personal and medical information but not the identification data. (The 
new Argentinean Civil Code will privilege this last possibility, but it will be flexible 
with regard to the other options as well.) 
As we have indicated before, this issue is deeply related to one critical topic of 
growing significance: that of (personal) identity. We will have to discuss what we 
understand by the Right to Identity in cases of children born through the ARTs 
with a donor (sperm or egg donation of a “third party”). This possibility provides a 
novel way of filiation, in comparison to those already outlined in the civil code: a 
“natural” filiation versus a legal form of adoption. We can now add a third form of 
filiation – of children born through ARTs. These questions of identity through 
heterologous fertilization certainly bring challenging concerns. Would it be desirable 
to define personal identity as a bio-psycho-social notion? This means that we must 
consider different aspects that are the components of an integral notion of the 
person’s identity. To address this issue, some lawyers specializing in the area of family 
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law suggest the differentiation of three types of identity for the cases we are analyzing 
(Herrera, 2014): 
1) Genetic identity: when there is a donor or a “third party”; 
2) Biological identity: defined for the union woman-baby; and 
3) Volitive identity. 
Let us clarify this a bit by considering one example: a heterosexual couple needs a 
sperm donation. In this case the “genetic identity” is provided by the donor and it is 
the only thing that relates the child to the third party. By contrast, the “biological 
identity” relates the child to the mother who provided the egg, who gestated it for 
nine months, and who gave birth to the child – there is a complex “bios” relationship 
between them. How about the father of the child? The mother´s husband is the one 
who wants to become a father (volitive identity) and therefore assumes all the rights 
and responsibilities for the child, but he need not be either a genetic or a biological 
father. 
It is also very interesting to consider the procreational will as a filiatory fact. In this 
case the father is a man who wants to become a father. Thus, there is no longer a 
bond to the genetic or biological dispositions, but the relationship is entirely based 
on the procreational will. Of course, this proposition does not solve all of the 
problems. There is a strong tension between the Right to Identity (if we understand 
it in the sense that every human being has the right, but not the obligation, to know 
his or her genetic background) and the Right to Privacy and Confidentiality (that 
guarantees no disclosure of the donor identification information). We could argue 
that in those cases it would be desirable to implement the Principle of 
Proportionality, assumed when the fundamental rights come into conflict. But, 
once again, the complexity of such situations exceeds our referential frameworks 
and calls for further reflection and discussion. They call for further re-thinking of 
how the natural (life, bios) and the ethical realms are related and should be related. 
Should nature guide ethics, or should it be the other way around? Or is there a 
possibility of a harmonious interaction of both elements, one worthy of this 
compound and ambitious name: bio-ethics?
While the legislative approach can give us a perspective on the complexity of the 
issues under analysis, it does not suffice to solve all open questions in this new field. 
That is why we try to review these scenarios that combine medical problems 
associated with legal complexities, by focusing on the ethical-subjective dimension 
in order to discern whether the technological impact will produce a symbolic 
transformation over human subjectivity, and whether it would affect the most 
internal aspect of our human condition. This inquiry issues a strong appeal to the 
significance of ethical reflection, not only from the position of the “decision maker” 
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but from the subjective positioning of all the actors involved; such ethical reflection 
should be treated as an unavoidable dimension concerning the scope of our scientific 
and clinical analysis. 
Accepting that ARTs constitutes a new form of filiation generates yet another type 
of concern. What we considered above was the current debate regarding the 
anonymity versus non-anonymity in cases of the gamete (egg or sperm) donation, 
the procedure known as “heterologous fertilization.” We would like to come back to 
this point because of its importance in the subjective constitution of children to be 
born, the consequences regarding this “third party” involvement in the procedure 
through the contribute of his/her genetic material, and the implications of the Right 
to Identity versus Right to Privacy of the donor. 
This dialectical constellation raises a fundamental question: Is it necessary to know 
that a person has been conceived by means of a gamete donation? Is this relevant for 
our identity? And if so, when it is appropriate to reveal that information? At what 
age? According to the psychoanalytic theory, our origin is an “empty space” for the 
subjectivity constitution. This means that this empty space must be necessarily filled 
by a narrative account, which establishes a fictional order of development necessary 
for and constitutive of the symbolic dimension of human subjectivity and personal 
identity. Of course, this has nothing to do with the biology of our genes, and that is 
why, following the legal normative, the father is the one who wants to be a father 
(volitive dimension of the procreational will) and not the man who contributes the 
sperm (the donor) with whom the child has just a genetic compatibility.
Thus, the question of paternity clearly goes beyond the dyads “true-false” and 
“legitimate-illegitimate” and cannot be reduced either to the technological or to the 
biological considerations. Has our contemporary science extinguished the old 
axiom: pater semper incertus, sed mater est certíssima (the father is always uncertain, 
but the mother is most certain)? Or does it assume that, with regard to the origin, 
there is strictly speaking nothing new to be said?
Speaking from this point of view, the truth about the origin remains an enigma, and 
that is why it needs to be addressed through a narrative-fictional dimension. Paul 
Ricoeur named this perspective a “narrative identity”: beyond the biological 
determination, our filiation is built on a narrative guided by the desire to know our 
origin and thus our identity (Ricoeur 1991). 
In his famous axiom, Lacan settles the need for a non-anonymous and singular 
desire for the irreducibility order of transmission (Lacan 1973). This connection to 
desire can be understood in two ways: the desire that precedes me and the desire to 
desire that consolidate this relationship. This procedure builds the symbolic order of 
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filiation for human beings; we will have to evaluate in the future if the developments 
of this scientific breakthrough (now called ARTS) can put at risk the symbolic 
dispositions that are the foundations of human subjectivity and personal identity.
Conclusion
The goal of our paper consists more in asking difficult questions and contexualizing 
them within our Western tradition, than in offering definitive answers to them. We 
have taken the ancient myth of Prometheus as a guiding force and a double-edge 
symbol of our scientific progress that so often – too often – leads to unforeseen and 
undesirable consequences. As much as it is important for all scientists – and 
especially those working at the very frontiers of sciences, such as reprogenetics – to 
exercise Ephimetheus’s gift of the afterthought, we would also need the help of his 
brother’s gift of forethought, which we must learn to exercise to the best of our 
abilities with regard to the directions and implications of new scientific 
breakthroughs. The frontiers of science must be constantly rethought and 
reevaluated, and the excitement of new discoveries must be accompanied by 
ethically sound appraisals. As we could see what happened with the development of 
the atomic energy, and as Francisco Goya so wisely forewarned, the sleep of reason 
produces monsters.
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Natacha Salomé Lima, Predrag Cicovacki
Suvremena bioetika: prometejski izazovi 
reprogenetike
SAŽETAK
Suvremena bioetika predstavlja velike izazove u nekoliko područja znanja. Sve više rastuća 
tehnološka moć utjecanja na prirodne stvari (uključujući ljudsku prirodu) zahtijeva povećanu 
etičku svjesnost i razmatranje. Kako ćemo odgovoriti na ove zahtjeve? Naš prijedlog za 
rješavanje ovog složenog problema je podsjećanje na jedan od mitova zapadne civilizacije, 
onaj o Prometeju. Među brojnim varijacijama ovog mita, u prvom dijelu rada obrađujemo 
Goetheovu pjesmu „Prometej” (1772), roman Mary Shelley „Frankenstein“ (1818), te 
kratku priču Franza Kafke „Prometej“ (1918). Razumijevanje ovog mita pomoći će nam u 
sužavanju pathosa uključenog u trenutne bioetičke dileme i dati nam priliku promišljanja 
o opsegu ljudskih aktivnosti u polju nedavnih znanstvenih dostignuća. U drugom dijelu 
rada razmatramo implikacije kreativne moći u procesima potpomognute oplodnje koji 
predstavljaju postmodernu verziju prometejskog izazova. Brz razvoj reprogenetike otvara 
važna pitanja o razvoju našeg ljudskog stanja i eroziji temelja tradicionalnog obiteljskog 
modela. Analizom pojedinih scenarija, u kojima se miješaju znanost, pravo i etika, na kraju 
podsjećamo i na grafiku španjolskog slikara Francisca Goye „The Sleep of Reason Produces 
Monsters” (1799). Simbolizam je u Goyinoj grafici mnogostruk, ali istražujemo onaj dio koji 
se najviše može povezati sa složenim odnosom bioetike i biopolitike. 
Ključne riječi: potpomognuta oplodnja, Prometej, bioetika, biopolitika, reprogenetika 
